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On the Differences Between Physics and Philosphy
by James Davis

For those of you that do not know who Karl Popper is, he is a 20th century philosopher who is responsible for the arguments where your philosophical roommates tell you that "You can't like... prove gravity exists. Just because the theory has worked until now doesn't mean it'll work tomorrow." Here's how his philosophy breaks down.

The following is a transcript between Ricky P. Feynguy and Karl Poppy and is true. Not true in the sense that it actually happened, but true in the sense that it's made up. But it is real, in that it exists... from an ontological standpoint. Philosophically, isn't that what's really important? Probably not.

Ricky P. Feynguy: Hello Sir Poppy, I'm curious about your views on the falsification of scientific theories.
Karl Poppy: Simply put, the criteria for an idea to be scientific depends on whether or not it can be falsified by observation. Although no theory can be proven true, it must have the capacity to be proven false.

R.P.F.: Absolutely. For an idea to be useful it has to make predictions about the outcomes of experiments. If those predictions are wrong, the theory is discarded... But if those predictions are correct, then the theory is confirmed. That's the definition of science; the belief that the truth of a theory is determined by observation, nothing else.

K.P.: But you're missing something profound. While no number of confirmations of a theory can prove it true, a single counter-example can falsify it. Thus, my philosophy of "critical rationalism" correctly asserts that all of our scientific knowledge is necessarily unconfirmed. No matter how many experiments fail to disprove quantum theory, you have no reason to believe that it will work in the next case. Induction is never valid; an idea is only "corroborated" by each instance it fails to be disproved.

R.P.F.: First, basic logic indicates that if any statement can be proven false (which you claim is possible), then its logical negation is necessarily proven true. Sure, if you take a very specific definition of what a "scientific theory" is, then it's easy to formulate things so that there is always an element of uncertainty. True, one can't confirm most theories in every case; but good theories are confirmed very well over time. From all of these confirmations, we can use induction to say that the theory is probably true.

K.P.: Absolutely not. Induction is never valid, logically. No matter how many falsification tests a theory passes, it only gains corroboration.

R.P.F.: Your emphasis on falsification is confusing and completely unnecessary. If someone theorizes that their pencil has rolled under the couch, no one would discover it and shout, "Fantastic, my ‘pencil under the couch' theory has failed to be falsified in this instance." Physicists spend their time looking for the Higgs boson or a superconducting transition, not trying to disprove some awkwardly worded negative theory.

K.P.: Regardless of your objections, the only sensible statement that can be made with a general scientific theory is of the form, "If theory A is correct, then result B will be obtained." The theory itself can never be proven, only corroborated.

R.P.F.: Isn't that what the rest of the English speaking world calls "deduction"? All you've done is substituted the word "corroboration" for "confirmation" or "proof". It seems like the job of the philosopher is not to develop new ideas, as much as rephrase old ones in bizarre and convoluted language.

K.P.: ... Editor's note: Above views are expressed in the following works: Karl Popper's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, and its rebuttals in Martin Gardner's Are Universes Thicker Than Blackberries, and also in Richard Feynman's The Meaning of It All.